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Abstract 
 
Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is a risk reduction evaluation methodology well suited to 
consider hazard scenarios with multiple initiating events. The presence of multiple initiators 
increases the likelihood that a hazard scenario could occur placing additional demands on the 
Independent Protection Layers (IPLs) that prevent and mitigate the hazard. This paper will discuss 
the impact of multiple initiating events on demand frequency, discuss methods to evaluate the 
effectiveness of IPLs, and determine which may be considered to reduce the demand on a Safety 
Instrumented Function (SIF) and Safety Integrity Level (SIL) targeting. Finally, the impact of 
demand frequency and proof test interval on SIF demand mode will be illustrated. 
 
Introduction 
The Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) was developed nearly twenty years ago to fill the gap 
between qualitative process hazard analysis (PHA) and detailed quantitative risk analysis (QRA). 
The objective of a LOPA is to determine what PHA safeguards serve as Independent Protection 
Layers (IPL) and confirm risk is reduced to as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP)1 levels. 
When a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) is one of the IPLs, the LOPA is also used to determine 
Safety Integrity Level (SIL) and SIF demand frequency. When used thoughtfully, much more 
information can be captured by the LOPA that is required for specification and design of a SIF.  
LOPA will also document key information later needed for Safety Requirements Specification 
(SRS) including: 
 Demand source 
 Demand frequency 
 Additional mitigation 
 Risk receptors 
 Related interlock
LOPA Presentation 
LOPA may be presented in many different formats. Figure 1 illustrates some common formats 





Figure 1 – Common LOPA Presentations 
Figure 1A is consequence based and captures a lot of information including identification of 
multiple initiating events and IPLs, but it does not provide a framework to assess the effectiveness 
of IPLs against individual initiators or risk receptors. Figure 1B is initiating event focused, 
provides a detailed analysis of the effectiveness of IPLs against the initiator, identifies multiple 
potential outcomes for an event and delivers some risk receptor information. Figure 1C is 
cause/consequence pair based focusing analysis on one branch of the event tree. All of these 
methods consider a worst case tolerable frequency regardless of risk receptor (e.g. safety, 
environment, business) for the analysis. 
This paper will utilize a LOPA format that considers multiple initiators in a single view and 
provides a framework to analyze the effectiveness of IPLs against individual initiators, separately 










Figure 2 – exSILentia Framework 
The LOPA is named (A) to represent the undesired consequence and may contain identifiers for 
the SIF intended to protect against the consequence. The tolerable target frequency of consequence 
for each risk receptor is defined in the summary table (B) at the top of Figure 2. Initiating events 
are presented in rows of the analysis table (C) with sub-rows for each risk receptor. Columns are 
grouped (left to right) by enabling conditions (EC), IPLs and Conditional Modifiers (CM) (D). 
Within the IPL subgroup, the IPLs are positioned in the sequence in which they are effective. For 
example, if the intended protection layer sequence is operator response to a process alarm, SIF 
action, then relief device actuation, IPLs would be placed in this order. The software interprets the 
sequencing to indicate which IPLs act to reduce demand (alarm) on the SIF and those that do not 
(relief). Probability of failure on demand (PFD) for the EC, IPL and CM layers are recorded in a 
background database and are applied where the user indicates effectiveness against initiating 
events (E). Intermediate frequency is calculated for each IE by risk receptor (F), and cumulative 
frequency is tallied by risk receptor in the summary table (G). The RRF column of the summary 
table indicates a gap between tolerable risk and scenario risk (H). Once PFD data is entered for all 
non-SIF IPLS, and protection has been assigned, target SIL may be calculated for the SIF (I).  
From this arrangement the information which may be extracted for the SRS includes: 
 Demand source – Description of initiating events with individual 
frequencies. 
 SIF Demand frequency – Calculated from individual demand 
frequencies considering EC and IPLs that reduce demand. 
 Additional mitigation – Complete list of IPLs that provides 
mitigation, ECs and CM that could be managed through other 
means. 
 Risk receptors – Summary by receptor provide information that 
could impact design decisions.  
 Related interlock – Processes may have interlocks in DCS, package 
equipment and SIS. Each is indicated by a separate IPL.  
 SIL Target – Directly calculated including residual risk. 
 
LOPA Evaluation as Individual Records 
When a LOPA does not consider multiple initiating events in a combined analysis, the SIL target 
and demand frequency can be underestimated, thus resulting demand mode may be misjudged. 
The following example considers three records extracted from a HAZOP for scenarios where the 
consequence of concern is a loss of pilots to a fired heater, with the potential for fire/explosion. 
The event consequence was determined to have a tolerable frequency of 1E-4 for business 
interruption, 1E-2 for environmental consequence and 1E-3 for safety.  Figure 3 illustrates a 
cause/consequence pair for a human error initiating event (cause 1). The valve is remotely located, 
so an enabling condition regarding accessibility of the valve is included to reduce the likelihood 
of this initiating event. Potential IPLs identified from the HAZOP safeguards are listed as a group. 
The PFD for the IPLs is entered in a database and assigned individually to each risk receptor, 
where they are effective. After all information is entered, the SIF PFD is calculated to close the 
gap between intermediate frequency and tolerable frequency. This analysis suggests the SIF should 
be a SIL 1 target RRF of 10 (RRF = 1/PFD = 1/0.1) with a demand frequency of 0.01/year (fIE * 
fEC). 
 
Figure 3 - Cause 1 
Figures 4 and 5 illustrate analysis for two additional cause/consequence pairs from the HAZOP 
record. Figures 3 and 4 both credit the pilot gas low pressure alarm for the operator response, but 
in Figure 5, the firebox high pressure is considered the more effective alarm. Only one alarm may 
be considered per IE because they reside in the same DCS, and are managed by the same operator 
(not independent). 
 
Figure 4 - Cause 2 
 
Figure 5 - Cause 3 
Each of the three LOPAs are anticipated to set the SIL target for the SIF. That will identify the 
loss of the pilot flame and bring the process to a safe state by tripping the fuel valves.  Results of 
the analysis are summarized in below in Table 1.  
  
Table 1 – Cause/Consequence Pair Analysis Summary 
 SIL Target SIF RRF target Demand Frequency / year 
Cause 1 1 10 0.01 
Cause 2 2 100 0.1 
Cause 3 1 10 0.01 
 
So what is the design basis for the SIF? Frequently, causes are considered separately so the SIF 
design basis may be selected on the ‘worst case’ scenario without consideration for the cumulative 
impact of multiple causes. Cause 2 has the highest SIL target and the highest demand frequency 
so users might select this as the ‘worst case’ design basis. Simply selecting the case that delivers 
the highest target, ignores residual risk and multiple demands as illustrated by a combined LOPA 
evaluation. 
 
Combined LOPA Evaluation  
In SIF design, the user must consider the combined impact of multiple initiating events, the 
effectiveness of IPLs against each cause, and the cumulative effect on both demand and RRF 
requirements. Figure 6 is a combined LOPA which includes all three initiating events in a single 
analysis. The inset below the LOPA is a view of the SRS, where the demand rate is automatically 
populated by exSILentia based on the LOPA. Target frequency, initiating event frequency, EC and 
non-SIF IPLs are the same as given in the individual analysis. The EC/IPL effectiveness is noted 
the same as in Figures 3-5, then the SIL target for the SIF is calculated.  
 
Figure 6 – Combined Evaluation 
The analysis yields a combined initiating event frequency of 0.12 demands per year and a SIL 2 
target with minimum RRF of 120. Table 2 is a summary comparing the results of the combined 
analysis to the results of the ‘worst case’ individual analysis from above.  
 
Table 2 – Design Basis Comparison 
 SIL Target SIF PFD target Demand Frequency / year 
Cause 2 design basis (‘worst case’) 2 100 0.1 
Combined analysis design basis 2 120 0.12 
 
The comparison in Table 2 demonstrates that the composite LOPA is effective in identifying the 
impact of multiple initiating events on the overall demand frequency and takes into account the 
residual risk, when establishing the SIL target. Considering cause/consequence scenarios 
separately results in an underestimation of both demand and the required RRF. It is important to 
note that summing the results of the individual analysis, shown in Table 1, will produce the same 
result as the combined analysis, unfortunately this step is often overlooked.   
 
Benefit of IPLs that Reduce Demand Frequency 
ECs, IPLs and CMs are arranged in the LOPA to consider the impact on initiating event and 
consequence frequency. This is similar to the approach of the event tree method shown in Figure 
1B. The columns should be placed left to right to reflect the expected sequence of events. Figure 
3 illustrates the adjustment of initiating event frequency based on the application of an enabling 
condition. In this example, the valve is located remotely from the process in an area where valves 
are seldom operated. The use of an EC clearly indicates a reduced likelihood of this initiator 
(human error) to those reviewing the LOPA at a later date. In this LOPA format, ECs are conditions 
that impact the initiating event frequency so they always reduce demand and are placed left of the 
IPLs. Conditional modifiers are conditions that impact the likelihood of a particular outcome once 
the scenario is initiated. CMs will always appear to the right of the IPLs because they do not impact 
SIF demand but do impact the potential for worst case consequence.  
Within the IPL group, columns are shifted left or right of the SIF based on both scenario 
development sequence and confidence in the IPL effectiveness to reduce demand. For example, a 
pressure safety valve (PSV) IPL would be placed to the right of the SIF because the SIF set point 
is below the relief threshold and the SIF should act before the PSV where a loss of containment 
consequence is realized. In a scenario where the initiating event is not DCS related (e.g. a human 
error), response of a DCS control loop may be credited as an IPL and would be placed left of the 
SIF because it is effective in reducing demand on the SIF. 
Operator response to an alarm is an IPL that may be considered to reduce SIF demand, or 
discounted due to potential ineffectiveness. The efficacy of operator response to an alarm is largely 
dependent on a facility’s alarm management program. A large quantity of alarms, confusing 
priority (e.g. critical alarm on a situation the operator knows to be minimal risk) and known 
nuisance alarms (e.g. sensor out of service) can work together to desensitize an operator and 
increase the likelihood that an operator would fail to respond appropriately to an alarm. Standards 
like ISA 18.23 have established a lifecycle framework for alarm management. Figure 74 illustrates 
experience of one oil and gas producer for two operator consoles before, during and after 
implementation of ISA 18.2.  
 
Figure 7 – Impact of ISA 18.2 on Alarm Load and Priority 
 
Before ISA 18.2 implementation, the operators routinely received large numbers of alarms and 
70% of the alarms were the same priority. After implementation the operators received 
significantly fewer alarms, and priority distribution was adjusted to improve visibility of more 
important alarms. A facility that has implemented an alarm management program, has completed 
alarm rationalization, utilizes advance alarm groups (flood suppression) and has a routine 
monitoring program to identify and correct issues, may have more confidence in the effectiveness 
of the alarm IPL5. Such an organization may elect to take credit for this and reduce the design 
demand rate on SIFs. In the exSILentia tool the alarm IPL columns are shifted left of the SIF and 
the demand rate calculated for the SRS is adjusted accordingly (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 8 – Alarm Credit to Reduce Demand Frequency 
 
Demand Mode 
It is a common expectation in the process industry that SIFs operate in low demand mode; 
however, this is not always the case.  IEC 61511 2nd edition explicitly states that a SIF is in high 
demand mode if the demand frequency is greater than once per year, and it suggests that a SIF 
should be considered high demand if “the failure [of the SIF] is undetected and a demand occurs 
before the next proof test interval” 6. It is important for facilities to document every SIF trip and 
perform periodic analysis to confirm the demand frequency is consistent with design basis.  
Demand frequency on a SIF is derived directly from the LOPA; however, additional information 
is required to determine SIF demand mode. Both demand frequency and proof test interval (PTI) 
must be considered when determining SIF demand mode. If a SIF is tested annually, the potential 
for an undetected SIF component failure is low, and the one-per-year threshold from low to high 
demand holds. As PTI is increased, the potential for a demand to occur between proof tests is 
increased.   For a SIF to be low demand mode, the initiating event frequency must be less than 
1/(2*PTI)7. Figure 9 illustrates how demand mode threshold changes as PTI is increased. 
  
Figure 9 – SIF Demand Mode Threshold 
Frequently, processes are designed so they must be shut down to complete proof testing, therefore, 
often PTI’s will correspond to turnaround schedules. As time between turnarounds is increased, 
the SIFs’ PTI is also increased and the SIF can unexpectedly move from low demand mode of 
operation to high demand mode. If the demand frequency identified in the SRS does not consider 
all initiating events, a SIF may be believed to operate in low demand mode when it is actually in 
high demand mode. In high demand mode the effectiveness of proof testing is not achieved, thus 
the risk reduction provided by the SIF may fall short of requirements and expectations.  
Early identification of SIFs that operate in high demand mode provides the most options to resolve 
back to low demand mode. A SIF may be moved from high to low demand by reducing the 
frequency of demand or decreasing the proof test interval. Table 3 provides some options: 
Table 3 – Demand Reduction Options 
Action Example 
Implement administrative program to reduce 
likelihood of single initiating event 
Implement valve locking (carseal) program for 
manual valves 
Reduce failure potential of initiating event 
through engineering solution 
Install two regulators in series rather than one 
Install additional instrumentation upstream 
that will address IEs closer to the source 























Implement programs that improve IPL 
confidence and reduce demands on SIF 
Alarm Management program per ISA 18.2 
Reduce proof test interval Install isolation and bypass capability to permit 
on line testing 
 
If proof testing can’t be implemented for the entire SIF on-line testing, such as partial stroke testing 
of a valve, can be helpful. Automatic diagnostics with appropriate diagnostics frequency and 
coverage are required to provide proof testing of high demand mode SIFs. 
 
Conclusion 
LOPA is a valuable tool to analyze the risk associated with an event scenario and document the 
expected effectiveness of protective layers. Many tools are available for conducting the analysis, 
but few are designed to consider multiple initiating events in a single view as illustrated by the 
figures above. When using a tool that performs analysis on single cause/consequence pairs, it is 
necessary to perform an additional step to determine the combined demand frequency and RRF 
requirement for the SIF. Failure to do so will result in an underestimation of both the initiating 
event frequency and the RRF target. 
 When a LOPA is used to determine the design basis for a Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) it 
is critical that the cumulative effects of multiple initiating events be considered together when 
assessing IPL effectiveness, and determining the SIF demand frequency and the SIL target. IPLs 
should be applied only against the initiating events where they are effective thus reducing the 
residual risk for that scenario. Some IPLs, such as operator response to an alarm, may be 
considered to reduce the demand rate on a SIF when well managed and monitored by a process 
such as the ISA 18.2 lifecycle. IPLs should only be considered to reduce SIF demand frequency 
when they are well managed and monitored to assure effectiveness. 
Finally, the proof test interval must be considered to convert demand frequency to demand mode. 
As intervals between PTI are increased, the potential for hidden failures is increased, thus high 
demand mode design criteria, including use of diagnostics, is more appropriate. A SIF designed 
for low demand mode, that is operating in a high demand mode condition is likely to deliver less 
risk reduction than targeted and may not be effective when called upon to bring the process to a 
safe state.  
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